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ABSTRACT 
This paper applies the theory of collective action to the 
arms race. The analytical property of strategic interdependence 
has completely changed since the end of the cold war. In the 
presence of the "evil empire," the allies' strategic structure 
was "strategic substitutes;" the strategic structure after the 
cold war was "strategic complements." During the cold war, 
defense was a public good, and the small countries had a tendency 
to exploit the large. In the period after the cold war, defense 
has become a public bad, and the large country tends to exploit 
the small. 
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1. Introduction 
After the fall of the Berlin wall, the "evil empire" against the 
free world disintegrated. There are, of course, potential local 
threats from countries like North Korea, Iraq, and actual fighting 
has been going on around Bosnia. Some of these conflicts may threaten 
us with the possibility of nuclear war, but the simple division of 
the world into the capitalist allies and the socialist bloc no longer 
exists. 
We will study the strategic structure of the post cold-war world, 
by applying a simple framework of the Nash equilibrium in game theory. 
To understand the nature of strategic interdependence in peace and 
military issues, the natural methodology is game theory. In fact, 
game theory was developed first as a theory of economic warfare, by 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). 1 I chose this topic of game 
theoretic approach also because I thought this type of topic might 
attract the younger generation of economists whose participation in 
the ECAAR in Japan as ~ell as in the United States is strongly needed. 
We will argue that the analytical properties of strategic 
interdependence have completely changed since the end of the cold 
war. In short, the strategic structure between the allies in presence 
of the "evil empire" had the nature of "free-ridership" or of 
"strategic substitutes"; that between nations after the cold war 
has the nature of "keeping up with the Joneses," or of "strategic 
complements." 
1 I often listen to the account of Shizuo Kakutani, who is known to economists for 
his fixed point theorem, on the research of van Neumann and Morgenstern at the Institute 
for.Advanced Studies at Princeton. He tells us that the theory of games was first known 
as the theory of economic warfare, and that his notes and research materials related to 
van Neumann's work were confiscated in New York when he had to go home on an exchange boat 
sent to repatriate U.S. and Japanese civilians stranded on the wrong side after the outbreak 
of the war. 
Before the breaking down of the Berlin wall, the alliance against 
the Communist bloc played the game of public goods where most 
countries tried to shift the burden of defense on to other countries. 
They were motivated to let others spend more on mutual defense. For 
the alliance as a whole, the supply of public goods fell short of 
the optimal level. The large country, or the hegemon, had incentives 
to spend for the international public good. The result was 
characterized by the phrase: "The small exploits the large" (Olson 
1965, Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966). Small countries deviate more from 
the appropriate supply of the public goods. In this situation, one 
country's increase in defense spending is countered by another's 
decrease. Modern game theorists call this situation the case of 
"strategic substitutes" in the Nash equilibrium. 
After the breakdown, what the alliance stood for became vague. 
The strategic structure has changed (Downs ed. 1994). We aim to 
characterize the exact nature of this structural change. In this 
changed world, nations do not know which other nations will be allies 
or enemies tomorrow. A nation will spend more on defense if another 
country, particular its neighbor, spends more. Nations engage in 
the process of "keeping up with the Joneses." Here the extra defense 
spending turn into "public bad" rather than "public good" and the 
supply of public bad risks becoming excessive. It will be shown below 
that small countries expand their expenditure more than proportion­
ally to their size. Figuratively, one could describe this situation 
"the large exploits the small." At least small countries spend more 
proportion of national income on defence expenditure. This situation 
is known in game theory., as the case of "strategic complements." 
In this paper we will address the nature of arms races or arms 
reduction before and after the melting ice of the Cold War. First, 
we will analyze how the strategic structure of interdependence 
changed after the fall of the Berlin wall and how the strategic 
structure of national incentives is related to the size of nations 
(Sections 2 and 3). Then, given the structure of international 
interdependence during and after the cold war, we will briefly 
discuss the problem of incentive compatibility in arm races. The 
question is: Is there any incentive structure for nations to reduce 
the abuse of their arms expenditures? In our simple framework, the 
answer to this question tends to be on the negative, pessimistic side 
( Section 4). Finally, we will conclude this short paper by 
summarizing the result and referring to related topics such as 
brinkmanship. 
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2 . The Hegemon and the Supply of Public Good during the Cold 
War 
Before the fall of the Berlin wall, the Western Allies commonly 
believed that their military alliance was a desirable thing and that 
their military expenditures had the nature of an international public 
good, or more precisely, a club-type public good. The same sentiment 
was most likely shared by countries in the socialist bloc. In other 
words, there was an evil empire on the opposite side of the Iron 
Curtain. At that time the major question was one of burden sharing 
of the defense expenditure: How, for example, do the Allies in NATO 
share the burden of defense expenditure? How are they motivated to 
contribute to the mutual defense? And are there not temptations to 
free ride by relying on other countries and, in particular, on the 
leader country like the United States? Similar questions could be 
asked for the nations within the Soviet bloc. 
An early, but stil],. influential argument, was developed by Olson 
(1965) and Olson & Zeckhauser (1965). Addressing the economics of 
military alliances, they found in the example of relative 
expenditures by NATO countries that a larger country spent a larger 
proportion of national income on military expenditure than smaller 
countries. The theoretical foundation of this tendency was developed 
as the theory of collective action (Olson, 1965). 
Game theory is not explicitly treated in his book, but the concept 
of the Nash solution is implicitly used in his analysis. The logic 
goes like this. First, the military alliance creates a defense 
capacity that is an international public good. It is a public good 
in the sense that one cannot exclude a member of the alliance from 
consuming and enjoying the service of the collective defense (non­
exclusiveness); it is a public good because if a nation enjoys the 
service of the alliance, the benefit to another nation will not be 
diminished (non-rivalry). 
Of course, these statements are a little too strong. Some 
exclusivity can be obtained under certain circumstances, and in that 
case the collective defense turns into a club good. Non­
exclusiveness does not apply in this case. Also, if a military power 
is defending one country, probably another country may find itself 
less secure if the force is employed on its border. Non-rivalry does 
not apply. 
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But these are subtle qualifications. The basic logic of the 
following public good analysis will essentially hold even if we take 
these qualifications into account. 
Let us develop simple examples of the alliance before the end of 
the Cold War. They are adapted versions of the model developed in 
Hamada, (1995). Though they are simple examples, they illustrate 
the basic property of strategic interdependence. 
Suppose there are two goods; private good, good 1, that is 
consumption good and public good; good 2, that is defense. The public 
good has the nature of non-rivalry and non-exclusiveness. Each 
citizen and, accordingly, nation contributes a certain amount of 
income to the supply of defense as an international public good for 
security. The hegemon has a population (normalized by the world 
population) of 1 - e, and the smaller country has the population of 
e. 
Suppose the utility of a representative individual in the two 
countries is respectively 
where c
1 
, c 2 are per capita consumption of private good and defense 




* are consumption of private 
good and defense by the citizen of the smaller country. a is the 
proportion of income that a nation would spend if there were no 
expenditure for defense by the other nation. 2 
Each individual of country 1 receives a unit of income that is 
given like manna in the form of private good 1, a part of which she 
consumes as good 1, and the rest of which she contributes to the 
alliance to provide defense. Each individual in country 2 similarly 
receives y* unit of income. Thus 
Here x2 and x2* are the per-capita contributions of citizens in the 
two countries. The world per-capita supply of defense is assumed 
to be the weighted sum of these contributions: 
2 We can obtain the same qualitative results without assuming specific forms of the 
utility function as long as the utility function is homothetic, but we rely on ( 1) for the 
sake of exposition. 
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The governments collect these contributions equally from individu­
als. They are assumed to play strategically given the amount of the 
contributions of the other country. 
One can derive the reaction curve of each country in terms of its 
contribution to the alliance. By maximizing utility ( 1), given the 
budget constraint (2) and defense provision (3) ,- and given the value 
of x
2 
or x2* of the other country, we obtain 
€ 
where 0 is defined by 0= (l _ e) • A smaller value of E corresponds 
to a smaller value of 0, that is, a higher degree of dominance of the 
hegemon. If the two countries have the same size 0 = 1. The resulting 
Nash equilibrium is given by the pair x and x *,
2 2 
(Sa) x2 = [y - 0(1 - a)y* J / ( 2 - a), 
X * = [y* - 0-1( 1 -a)y]/(2 - a), if 0(1 - a)-1 >-
y 
> 0(1 - a)2 = y* = 
(Sb) = ay, x* = o, if 'I_> 0(1 - a)-1x2 2 y* = 
(Sc) x 2 = 0, x 2 * = ay* if ~* ~ 0 ( 1 - a) 
which never happens if y* > y and 0< 1. 
The case (Sb) indicates where the hegemon can become a privileged 
group on its own. More precisely, the hegemon has to be a privileged 
group because the other country does not spend on defense. Case (Sc) 
is unlikely to occur because we assume 0 is small. 
Figure 1 illustrates these reaction curves. If e, and accordingly 
0, are small, the reaction curve of the hegemon does not diverge from 
the optimal provision of the defense expenditure x
2 
= ay. The internal 
Nash solution described by (i) is shown by the intersection of two 
reaction curves. In fact one can easily ascertain that the contract 
curve (or the Pareto optimal cooperative solution) lies on a curve 
that passes through point (ay, ay*) . On the other hand, when E and 
0 are small, the reaction curve of the smaller country diverges 
greatly from the optimal provision x
2 
* = ay*. As is indicated in the 
diagram, the small can exploit the large in this case involving the 
public good. 
5 
This type of approach was taken by Olson (1965), and by Olson and 
Zeckhauser (1966). The latter work includes a diagram similar to 
Figure 1, and the former contains the well-known remark, "there is 
a systematic tendency for 'exploitation' of the great by the small" 
(Olson, 1965, p.29). Olson and Zeckhauser support this hypothesis 
by examining NATO countries' defense expenditure data. Few seem to 
be clearly aware of the fact, however, that this exploitation 
property stems from the situation involving the suppl.y of a public 
good and that the opposite is true in the situation with the private 
good (see Hamada 1995). 
A similar approach can be applied if there are many small 
countries and a large hegemon. Suppose that a small country occupies 
a fraction E of the world economy, but that there are n small 
countries. The hegemon's reaction function does not change except 
that 0 is defined as nt/(1 - nt). Reaction functions of smaller 
countries are modified. That is, 
a 1-ne
( 6) x = ay - 0 ( 1 - a) x *, x * = ---- - y*- ---- ( 1 - a) x • 
2 2 2 [ (1-a)n+a] (1-a)ne+ae 2 
The behavior of smaller countries will divert even further (Figure 
2). The resulting Nash (internal) equilibrium is given by 
0(1-a)a (1-ne)(l-a)ay ay*l [ l
( 7) x2 = [ay -----y* ID, 2 ---------- /D,x*= (1-a)n+a [(1-a)n+a]e (1-a)n+a 
where D is the determinant defined as 
D - 1 - n(l - a) 2 / [(l - a)n + a] 
which is found to be always positive. 
In the terminology of modern game theory, the situation of public 
good is called the case of strategic substitutes. In this situation, 
both reaction curves are negatively sloping. If one country expands 
its military expenditure, the other has an incentive to reduce its 
own. The expenditure of one party works to substitute the expenditure 
of the other. 
Table 1 shows the simplified pay-off matrix of the game just 
described for a symmetric world. Two equal sized countries are in 
a military alliance and jointly cope with a common enemy. If both 
countries take substantial responsibility for military spending, the 
outcome ( 2, 2) will be realized. However, a country can take a free 
ride strategy that it will save its military expenditure once the 
other country provides sufficient defense spending. If both take 
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this free ride attitude, then the alliance will end up with less than 
optimal military expenditures. Accordingly, as in Figure 1 the 
reaction curve of country 1, which is the focus of country 1 's optimum 
response given the other country's strategy has a downward slope. 
That is, if the other country spends more, then this country will 
spend less. 
Moreover, if we introduce a big country and a small country, the 
former is much more motivated to defend the region. If we consider 
the free world where the United States occupies a large space relative 
to other countries, then the United States will have an intrinsic 
interest to defend all the territory of the free world. A large 
country is more concerned with its territory. To protect its well 
being, the large country is motivated to share a substantial or even 
the total burden of defense expenditure. (If it is motivated to share 
the total burden, we call it a privileged group.) On the other hand, 
as long as the large country, the hegemon, spends a large amount on 
defense, small countries do not much improve their welfare if they 
spend on defense. The reason is that the defense as an international 
public good is the result of the sum of activities of the allied 
countries. 3 
From this angle, Olson and Zeckhauser calculated the relative 
contributions in NATO's defense expenditure and observed the 
tendency for a larger country to pay more than a proportionate share 
of the burden of military expenditures. 
3 The reaction curve of a small country comes down and a large country has to bear 
a substantial or a total volume of defense expenditure. 
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3 . Competition for Defense Expenditures After the Fall of the 
Berlin Wall 
From the time the ice of the Cold War began to melt, the strategic 
structure of military interdependence has changed. There is no 
strong absolute enemy or "evil empire". On the other hand, one nation 
does not know which other country may become its potential enemy. 
Yesterday's friend may be tomorrow's enemy. And if one country starts 
increasing its military expenditures, other countries are compelled 
to match that spending. In this sense the strategic structure has 
changed. In this situation, even though they know reducing armaments 
is mutually beneficial, each country worries about the spending by 
its neighbor and expands its military expenditures. Hypothetically, 
if Iran's military expenditure increases, so does Iraq's. For the 
world as a whole, a competitive arms race will develop. In this case, 
the exploitation of the large by the small does not apply. Rather, 
small countries tend to spend a larger proportion of their income 
on defense. 
Thus, let us consider the case that the expansion of defense 
expenditure by a neighboring nation is detrimental to the country. 
Let us assume the same utility functions ( 1) , consumption constraints 
( 2) as in the last section. However, in this section we will assume 
that the level of security depends on the difference between one's 
defense expenditure (adjusted by the country size) and a part of the 
other country's expenditure (adjusted by its country size): 
where O < P < l indicates the degree of neighborhood effect. 
In the same way as in the previous section, one can derive the 
reaction curves in the following form: 
where 0 is again equal to e/(1 - e). 
Hereonecanseethereactioncurvesarepositivelysloped (Figure 
2). In this simple model, the contract curve passes through the 
origin. The intersection of the reaction curves gives the Nash 
solution where defense expenditure of nations far exceeds the 
desirable one. The Nash equilibrium is always internal and given 
by 
a,[y + 0(1 -a)By*]/D, x 2* = a[y* - e-
1 (1 - ab]/D, 
D 1 - (1 -a)2s2 
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if 0 is small, x
2
* will become large. Thus a smaller country will 
spend a larger proportion of its income on defense. We can thus 
paraphrase Olson's familiar dictum as "the large exploit the small." 
Small countries correspond to a lower value of 0 for the reaction 
function determining x
2 
*, and relatively small countries tend to 
spend more than proportionately on defense. This section shows that 
competitive arms build-ups will follow once each country looks on 
its neighbors as potential enemies. 
It may be possible to argue that many Asian countries are 
expanding their armaments according to the strategic complements 
structure. Also after the disappearance of the communist bloc's 
threat, the nature of strategic interdependence has changed to 
emphasize the strategic complements nature within a bloc. In fact 
Olson and Zeckhauser noticed in their classical article that if 
alliance countries are mutually, even partially, hostile toward each 
other then the alliance will be strong. If they spend to defend 
themselves against their neighbor, then they automatically spend for 
defending the alliance. But what they considered as an auxiliary 
element now becomes in the changed framework the main element that 
leads strategic confrontations. 
The pay-off table in the post cold-war world can be depicted as 
Table 2. If two countries reduce arms, everything will be fine. If 
one of them reduces its armed forces but the other expands them, this 
could increase the prospects that the arms reducing country will be 
invaded by the other. Basic conflicts between hostile governments 
take this form. In fact, even during the cold war this was the basic 
I 
structure between the western allies and the communist/socialist 
bloc countries. Within each alliance there are problems of free­
riding as analyzed by Olson and Zeckhauser, but between the alliances 
or blocs this structure of strategic complements existed. 4 
4 Under the American Constitution (The Second Amendment), the right to bear arms is 
recognized. This article made much sense when it was established, because Americans had 
to fight against the colonizing enemies. The right to resist against the enemies by 
federation was the situation of strategic substitutes. When this article is invoked to resist 
gun control, however, the situations in American cities are those of strategic complements. 
In this current situation, bearing arms to protect other (or public officials?) will result 
in an unfavorable equilibrium in the prisoners' dilemma. 
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From our analysis, we obtain two testable hypotheses: 
(i) Within a military alliance, and particularly before the breakdown 
of the cold war, large countries spend more than proportionately 
(with respect to their size) on defense. 
(ii)Without the military alliance, smaller countries spend more than 
proportionately (with respect to their size) on defense. 
Also one can take account of various topological factors: 
geographical, ethnic, religious and cultural distance between 
countries. One can examine the distance of the relationship in terms 
of circular matrices. One can modify the formulation to take account 
of political systems such as dictatorship, democracy or post 
socialist states, and the degree of international transactions like 
trade and investment, and most importantly the current situation of 
the nation and its preconditions given by its history. 
Figure 3 depicts the ratios of military expenditure to GDP and 
how NATO nations ranked by population in 1993. Here one can detect 
a weak positive relationship long discussed since Olsons and 
Zeckhauser. This is the prediction from the theory of collective 
action, the case of strategic substitutes. Figure 4A and 4B 
(excluding China) show the same relationship for Asian counties where 
no strong military alliances exist between countries. This figure 
indicates a surprisingly strong negative relationship --- just as 
predicted by the strategic complements model discussed in this 
section. 
Incidentally, the strategic structure of international policy 
coordination and monetary interdependence has two structurally 
different relationships. Under a fixed exchange rate system, 
monetray interdependence assumes the nature of strategic substi­
tutes. If one country provides more money, then the other countries, 
trying to reduce the inflationary pressure, reduce their money 
supply. Therefore, an expansion in one country is offset or 
substituted by a reduction in the others. 
On the other hand, under one flexible exchange rates an expansion 
of the monetary policy by country may be transmitted to others as 
a contradictory shock. Therefore, it triggers an expansionary 
monetary policy in other countries. Expansion is matched by 
expansion, which is a strategic complements situation. 
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4. Revelation of Information and the Structure of Interdependence 
The difference between strategic substitutes and strategic 
complements has recently attracted the attention of economists and 
game theorists. The difference can decide in many cases the direction 
of comparatively static results in the Nash equilibrium. 
First, we can change the game slightly, and make it a succession 
of two players, a first mover and a second. Then it is shown (Gal­
Or, 1985) that the first mover has an advantage under strategic 
substitutes and the second mover has an advantage under strategic 
complements. In our military context, in the case of the free-rider 
game under the cold war regime, the United States would be able to 
profit from its leadership. Its credible commitment would win 
favorable responses from others. Under the situation of strategic 
complements, as has prevailed since the Berlin Wall, a waiting 
strategy is beneficial. Why don't we wait for the other country? 
The logic is: After watching your potential enemy's arms build-up, 
you will start boosting your armaments to make them a little stronger 
than your potential opponent ' s. Thus the waiting strategy will work. 
Under the strategic substitutes case, the United States can 
easily assume the leadership role because of its size. Its first 
move can be taken as a definite signal. Under the strategic 
complements case, no country, not even the United States, will have 
incentives to take the initiative. The situation will thus become 
more ambiguous, and possibly unstable. 
The sec.end interesting implication of the distinction between 
strategic substitutes and complements concerns the revelation game 
of information. Suppose it is not easy to know the cost and benefit 
data of the opponent in arms races. Okuno, Postlewaite and Suzumura 
( 1990) considered the following situation. Suppose the home country 
cannot detect the foreign country's cost benefit data concerning the 
level of military technology. On the other hand, the foreign country 
is capable of knowing the home country's cost benefit structure and 
accordingly its reaction curve. For simplicity, let us assume that 
only the home country does not know whether the foreign country has 
a low cost of producing arms (but possesses the nuclear technology, 
for example) or a high cost of producing arms (does not possess 
nuclear technology). 
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Under this asymmetric information structure, the foreign country 
has the choice of whether to announce its cost structure, or to keep 
it secret. In other words, the foreign country can reveal or conceal 
whether it has a low cost and accordingly is capable of behaving in 
an aggressive fashion or it has a high cost. Then the game consists 
of two stages: the first stage of information revelation, and the 
second stage of arms build-up. 
For example, the question is as follows: For a European NATO 
member country, is there an incentive to tell the other members of 
the NATO, particularly the United States, whether or not it has the 
technology to produce weapons cheaply? 
Okuno et. al. (1990) give a clue to this question. Suppose, 
in accordance with them that after the announcement, the low cost 
structure of military armaments by country 1 can be verified by 
country 1, but that the high cost structure cannot be verified. 
Presumably, a high productivity of producing defense equipments such 
as nuclear weapons can be easily verified. But if it is kept secret, 
it is not easy from the first country to detect whether the second 
country has high productivity in producing arms. Let us remember 
the initial premise that the cost structure of the home country is 
known to the foreign country. 
Let us start from the case of the strategic substitutes. That 
is, the case of a military alliance. Figure 5 illustrates the 
incentive for information revelation. The reaction curve of the 
foreign country is either R*I\* or R*R
8 
*, depending on whether it has 
a low or a high cost structure. Without revelation and some 
simplifying assumptions of linearity, the home country takes the 
average and R*R* becomes the foreign country's reaction curve. 
Therefore the home country takes strategy X and the foreign country 
takes the strategy on R*R
8 
* or R*RL* depending on its cost structure. 
The resulting equilibrium is either PL or P
8 
If the foreign country• 
reveals its cost structure truthfully, the home country knows the 
position of the true reaction curve of the foreign country and 
achieves Q ors. 
In this situation, it is not profitable for the foreign country 
to reveal that it has low costs, because the home country will reduce 
military expenditures and thus shift the burden to the foreign 
country. Then the equilibrium shift from PL to Q. Even though the 
low cost structure can be verifiable by our assumption, this 
revelation is not supported by the incentive mechanism, because the 
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foreign country loses its free-riding position. On the other hand, 
it is profitable for the foreign country to announce that it has high 
costs because by that revelation the foreign country would enjoy more 
of the free rider status. If the announcement is believed, the 
equilibrium moves from P to S. Unfortunately, the foreign country 
gains by pretending that it has high costs even though it has low 
costs, because in the latter the equilibrium would shift from PL to 
P
5
• The revelation of the high costs thus creates the credibility 
problem and does not work either. In the real world example, if a 
European country says that it does not have high productive capacity 
for defense, it is not verifiable under our assumption. It might 
be interpreted as a pretext for further free riding, and accordingly 
might not be believed. 
Similarly, Figure 6 illustrates the incentive for information 
revelation in the case of strategic complements. The reaction curve 
of the foreign country is either R*RL* or R*R
8 
*. Without revelation, 
the home country takes the average and takes R*R* as the foreign 
country's reaction curve. Therefore the home country adopts strategy 
X and the foreign country chooses the strategy on R*RL* or R*R * 
8 
depending on its cost structure. The resulting equilibrium is either 
PL or P
8
• If the foreign country reveals its cost structure 
truthfully, the home country knows the position of the true reaction 
curve of the foreign country and achieves Q ors. 
In this situation, it is not profitable for the foreign country 
to reveal that it has low costs, because the home country will build 
up its own armaments and the equilibrium will then shift from PL to 
Q. Even though the low cost structure is verifiable by our 
assumption, such a revelation is not supported by the incentives for 
the country that has the choice to announce or not. On the other 
hand, it is profitable for the foreign country to reveal that it has 
high costs. Unfortunately, the foreign country gains by pretending 
that it has high costs even though they are low, because the 
equilibrium shifts from PL to R. Revelation of high costs thus creates 
a credibility problem and does not work either. For example, if North 
Korea says that it does not have nuclear weapons, and if it not 
verifiable under our assumption, then South Korea will have 
difficulty to trust it. 
Thus, whether the case concerns strategic substitutes or 
complements, there are incentives to pretend to having high costs 
-- and not revealing the full truth. Pretending to be a high cost 
country helps free riding (the case of substitutes), or inducing the 
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rival country to relax its guard (the case of complements). An 
incentive compatible system is not constructed in this particular 
model. All the discussions will be different if we change the 
assumption that on;J..y a low cost structure is verifiable. The presence 
of any surveillance or inspection method that can verify the absence 
of certain types of weapons would help towards achieving relative 
arms reductions in the world. 
Finally, a highly relevant factor for defense analysis is the 
"game of brinkmanship." Brinkmanship is also called the game of 
chicken, which is a challenge to see which player will give in first. 
For example, two opponents drive cars towards each other at a high 
speed from opposite ends of a road to see who will turn away first 
to avoid a crash. If neither driver concedes, then a catastrophe 
results. If one party "chickens out," then the other driver will 
win. In international politics, the best cited example of 
brinkmanship is the Cuban missile crisis staged by John F. Kennedy 
and Nikita Khrushchev. Another example is the Mayaguez Incident 
which occurred during the U.S. war with Vietnam (Nalebuff, 1991). 
After many frustrating incidents in Vietnam, a U.S. ship, the 
Mayaguez, was captured by Cambodia, but a U.S. military force 
immediately intervened and rescued it. Even an often believed 
liberal newspaper like the New York Times wrote that the confidence 
in the U.S. military authority that had been lost in Vietnam was 
recovered. A non-military example was the recent Japan-u.s. trade 
conflict concerning the import of American automobiles to Japan. 
In a brinkmanship game, it is always safe for each player to adopt 
a compromising attitude to avoid a crisis. However, sometimes a 
nation has to signal its commitment to its principles or to a hard 
line strategy. If one player concedes, then the other will continue 
to take advantage. In the trade conflict game, for example, Japan 
--- in spite of reportedly having their conversation bugged --- tried 
to keep a strong attitude for a possible appeal to the WTO. This 
is a continuing game, and reputation is important. If you sometimes 
act with a firm commitment, your opponent might become conciliatory. 
Of course, if the other party also takes an uncompromising attitude, 
both parties will end up with the worst situation, for example, the 
breakdown of relationships if it is a trade negotiation game, and 
possible nuclear destruction if it is a strategic game. 
When one player takes an uncompromising attitude, there is a 
dynamic trade-off between the long-term benefits of reputation 
building and the short run opportunity cost probability of 
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catastrophe. Nalebuff (1986) shows through a dynamic benefit cost 
analysis that the tactics of playing gently at first, and then playing 
tough later does not pay. Where there is uncertainty, showing a 
strong attitude may help build the credibility of commitment towards 
the opposite party. 
S. Conclusions 
We would like to conclude this short paper by emphasizing the fact 
that the strategic structure of world military interdependence has 
changed from the alliance structure to the competitive arms building 
since the fall of the Berlin wall. The strategic structure changed 
from one of strategic substitutes to strategic complements. Of 
course, in those areas, where neighboring disputes or actual warfare 
are going on, such as Iraq, Iran, Israel, North Korea and Bosnia, 
the above theory would be too abstract. In those areas there would 
only be limited applications of the pure theory we have just 
developed. 
However, the tendency for small countries to spend more in a 
"keeping up with the Joneses" game is worth noting. This is in 
contrast to the tendency that a large country in an alliance spends 
more because others are tempted to enjoy free-rides positions in a 
military alliance. The corresponding theoretical difference between 
strategic substitutes and the strategic complements is also 
important because the incentive to disclose military strength is 
affected by the distinction of substitutes and complements. 
Finally, the crucially important problem for peace research is 
to design a system that gives fewer incentives to spend on military 
arms and accordingly to reduce the risk of war. One way would be 
to improve the pay-off structure. Another would be to change the 
rules of the game itself in such a way that the equilibrium from the 
game will be more peaceful. In addition, nations could be persuaded 
to play under new rules of the game. 5 In the theory of public goods 
and collective action, this problem of how to design a proper game 
to avoid the tragedy of commons or the prisoners' dilemma is 
5 If you play a game of poker you have to determine under what conditions you play, 
say a five card draw or seven card stud. However, for some people a certain way of playing 
a game is intrinsically more advantageous than another way. 
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relatively less developed (c.f. Sandler 1992). In game theory the 
theory of mechanism design has been developed, but most of its refined 
applications are directed to the optimal auction design and similar 
problems. There exists a considerable distance before it can be 
applied to institution building and to the problem of arms reduction. 
We need a theory that indicates not only what rules and regimes 
are desirable but how actual rules and regimes emerge. If we can 
succeed in designing an incentive-compatible system that would 
reduce the calamity of wars and, at the same time, help to find an 
incentive compatible way to induce each nation to participate in the 
arms-reduction schemes, it would mean substantial improvement in 
human conditions on the globe. 
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TABLE 1 
Before the Berlin Wall 
Risk from the Evil Empire 
Responsibility Free Ride 
Responsibility (2, 2) ( 1, 3) 
Free Ride (3, 1) ( 1, 1) 
TABLE 2 
After the Berlin Wall 
Armament Reduction 
Armament (1, 1) (3, O) 
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FIGURE 4~ 
Far East Countries (excluding China and N. Korea) 
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